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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Pet~tioner and Appellant, 
-vs.-
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 
9313 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner, University Heights, Inc., was at all times 
pertinent hereto, a corporation owning and operating 
an apartment house in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Because of the net operating loss sustained by peti-
tioner in 1956 and the small profits earned in 1957 and 
1958 as indicated below, the corporation franchised tax 
liability to the State of Utah was computed as 1/20th 
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of one per cent of the ''Fair Value" of the tangible prop-
erty owned by petitioner in accordance with the provi-
sions of Title 59, Chapter 13, Section 3, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. 
Petitioner detennined the "Fair Value'' of its assets 
for the years in quesion by multiplying the assessed value 
of said property, for property tax purposes, by two and 
one half since if the assessed value of said property were 
40% of its value, the full value could thus be determined. 
In so doing petitioner relied upon Title 59, Chapter 5, 
Section 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 which states ~that 
''all taxable property must be assessed at forty p·er cent 
of its reasonable fair cash value." 
During December, 1959, the State Tax Commission 
audited the corporation franchise tax returns of peti-
tioner for the years 1956, 1957 and 1958, and the Tax 
Commission assessed additional tax, shown below, 
against the petitioner as the result of its refusal to 
recognize the method used by petitioner in fixing the 
value of its property. 
The Tax Commission determined the value of peti-
tioner's property by reference to the historical cost of 
said property less allowances for depreciation recorded 
on petitioner's .records, as reflected in the balance sheets 
shown on the tax returns filed by petitioner. 
The following schedule details the gain or (loss) of 
petitioner for each of the years in question, the tax that 
was reported and paid by petitioner, and the tax assessed 
by the State Tax Commission for each year: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
Gain or 
Year (Loss) 
1956 ---------------------- ( $3,178.23) 
19:>7 ---- ---------------- 2,226.82 
1958 ---------------------- 3,017. 73 
Totals ------------------ $2,066.32 
Tax 
Paid 
$246.50 
237.26 
224.03 
$707.79 
Tax 
Assessed 
$ 462.40 
436.97 
428.12 
$1,327.49 
The sole question to be answered by this appeal is 
what is the correct basis for determining the value of the 
tangible property owned by petitioner during the years 
in question. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE HISTORICAL COST OF PE1TITIONER'S TAXABLE 
PROPERTY LESS ARBITRARY DEPRECIATION RECORD-
ED ON PETITIONER'S BOOKS DOES NOT REPRESENT 
THE ''FAIR VALUE'' OF SAID ASSE'TS WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF TITLE 59, CHAPTER 13, SECTION 3, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
POINT II 
THE PROVISIONS OF 'TfTLE 59, CHAPTER 5, SECTION 
I, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, WHICH ATTEMPT TO 
QUALIFY THE CASH VALUE A:T WHICH PROPERTY IS 
TO BE ASSESSED BY THE ADDITION OF THE WO·RDS 
"REASONABLE" AND "FAIR'' ARE A VIOLATION OF 
ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 3 OF THE ~CONSTI'TUTION OF 
UTAH. 
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POINT III 
THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 59, CHAPTER 5, SECTION 
46, SUBSECTION (9) WHICH ATTEMPT TO REQUIRE THE 
STATE TAX COMMISSION TO ASSESS ALL PROPERTY 
"AT TRUE VALUE'' IS A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE XIII, 
SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
POINT IV 
THE TERM ''FAIR VALUE'' USED IN THE UTAH COR-
PORATION FRANCHISE TAX ACT HAS THE SAME MEAN-
ING FOR TAXATION PURPOSES AS 'THE TERMS "VALUE 
IN MONEY'' USED IN THE CONSTITUTION; THE TERM 
"TRUE VALUE" AND THE TERM "REASONABLE FAIR 
CASH VALUE'' USED IN THE CODE IN DEFINING THE 
MEASURE OF VALUE TO BE USED IN DETERMINING 
THE ASSESSED VALUE OF PROPERTY FOR PROPERTY 
TAX PURPOSES. 
POINT V 
STATE TAX COMMISSION IS REQUIRED BY LAW TO 
ASSESS ALL PROPERTY AT 400fo OF ITS VALUE. TAX 
COMMISSION MUST FIRST DETERMINE FULL VALUE 
BEFORE THEY CAN ARRIVE AT 40% OF THE VALUE 
OF PROPERTY, AND ACCORDINGLY THE FULL VALUE 
IS 2¥2 TIMES THE ASSESSED VALUE. 
POINT VI 
SITATE TAX COMMISSION IS BOUND BY ITS DETER-
MINATION OF THE VALUE OF PROPERTY FOR PROP-
ERTY TAX PURPOSES AND IT CANNOT CLAIM THAT 
SAME PROPERTY HAS A VALUE 185% HIGHER FOR 
FRANCHISE TAX PURPOSES THAN FOR PROPERTY TAX 
PURPOSES. 
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POINT VII 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND DECISION 184 BEFORE THE STATE TAX COMMIS-
SION OF U'TAH ARE CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND THE 
FACTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE HIST'ORICAL COS'T OF PE1TITIONER'S TAXABLE 
PROPERTY LESS ARBITRARY DEPRECIATION RECORD-
ED ON PETITIONER'S BOOKS DOES NOT REPRESENT 
THE ''FAIR VALUE'' OF SAID ASSETS WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF TITLE 59, CHAPTER 13, SECTION 3, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
In paragraph 4 of the findings of fact in decision 
184 of the State Tax Commission of Utah, the Tax Com-
mission states that it determined the value of petitioner's 
property for the years in issue "by reference to deprecia-
ted book values as shown by the balance sheets on re-
turns filed by the taxpayer.'' (The petitioner herein.) 
Chapter 59, Title 13, Section 3, of Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, provides in part as follows: 
"Every bank or corporation ... shall annual-
ly pay to the state a tax ... , or one-twentieth of 
one per cent of the fa~r value during the next 
preceding taxable year of the tangible property 
in this state ... " (Italics added.) 
The only indication in the foregoing statute of the 
measure of value of the petitioner's property is that the 
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value shall be the "fair value." Nothing is stated in said 
statute about book value or depreciated value being the 
measure of value for purposes of this statute. 
The United States Supreme Court repudiated the 
book value test as the measure of value in stating that 
present or future "value,'' however ascertained, was 
single in substance, being the money equivalent of the 
property as a whole which could not be arrived at by 
mere summation of actual or estimated cost of constitu-
ent elements, new or depreciated. (M. E. Blatt Co. v. 
u. 8.' Ct. ICI., 59 s. Ct. 186, 190.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "The word 
'value' standing by itself can have only one meaning, viz. 
the full worth or actual value - not a fractional share 
thereof." (Board of Education of Rich County School 
D~strict v. Passey, 122 Ut. 102, 246 P. 2d 1078.) 
Reproduction cost less depreciation is more depend-
able method of fixing fair value than historical cost less 
depreciation. (City of Rvchmond v. Henrico County, 37 
S.E. 2d 873, 883, 185 Va. 176.) 
Determination of the value of pToperty by reference 
to book value alone is unrealistic in that it fails to take 
into consideration such factors as the method and rate of 
depreciation used, the policy as to adding certain items 
to the assets or charging them to expense when pur-
chased, the market conditions, the state of repair of the 
property, use to which property is employed, profit po-
tential, obsolescence·, demand for the prop·erty and other 
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such factors. Book value is only one of many factors to 
be considered in determining "fair value." 
1fodification of the term "value'' by addition of the 
word ''fair" does little to provide a guide as to value 
except to indicate that the value used shall not be unfair. 
The term ''fair value" used in the statute mentioned 
above is usually held to mean the same as "reasonable 
value," "actual value," ''market value," and like terms, 
and is generally the figure fixed by sales in ordinary busi-
ness transactions. See 16 Words and Phrases, perman-
ent edition page 167 for cases which define the term ''fair 
value." 
There IS no substantial difference in meaning be-
tween "fair value" and "full cash value.'' (Sears Roe-
bttck & Co. v. State Tax Comm., 136 A.2d 567, 570, 214 
Md. 550.) 
See further discussion under Point IV concerning 
the meaning of "fair value" and relationship between 
value of property as defined in property tax and corpo-
ration franchise tax laws. 
POINT II 
THE PROVISIONS OF ~TrTLE 59, CHAPTER 5, SECTION 
I, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, WHICH ATTEMPT TO 
QUALIFY THE CASH VALUE A1T ,WHICH PROPERTY IS 
TO BE ASSESSED BY THE ADDITION OF THE WORDS 
"REASONABLE" AND "FAIR'' ARE A VIOLATION OF 
ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTI'TUTION OF 
UTAH. 
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Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides in part as follows: 
''The Legislature shall provide by law a uni-
form and equal rate of assessment and taxation 
on all tangible property in the State, according to 
its value in money . .. " (Italics added.) 
From territorial days until1957 the statutes required 
that all taxable property be assesszwt its "full cash 
value." (See 80-5-1, UCA, 1943.) In this statute was 
amended to read that "All taxable property must be as-
sessed at forty percent of its· reasonable fair cash value . 
. . . " (Italics added.) 
The Constitution of Utah clearly states that prop-
erty shall be assessed and taxed according to its cash 
value. The addition of the words "reasonable" and "fair" 
to modify the value in money or cash value standard set 
by the Utah Constitution is unconstitutional and renders 
said statute void. 
POINT III 
THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 59, CHAPTER 5, SECTION 
46, SUBSE~CTION (9) WHICH ATTEMPT TO REQUIRE THE 
S'TATE T'AX COMMISSION TO ASSESS ALL PROPERTY 
"AT TRUE VALUE'' IS A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE XIII, 
SE,CTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
The provisions of Title 59, Chapter 5, Section 46, 
Subsection (9) pertaining to the general powers and 
duties of the State Tax Commission provides in part that 
property will be assessed : 
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'' to the end that all assessments of prop-
erty be made relatively just and equal, at true 
value, and . . ." ( i te;f I/ c .s a .t et'" ~cR) 
Clearly the use of the term ''at true value" as used 
in this statute is contrary to the plain wording of the 
constitution, quoted in point II above, and accordingly 
said statute is void since the constitution requires that 
all property be assessed according to "its value in 
money." 
POINT IV 
THE TERM ''FAIR VALUE'' USED IN THE UTAH COR-
PORATION FRANCHISE TAX ACT HAS THE SAME MEAN-
ING FOR T·AXATION PURPOSES AS 1THE TERMS "VALUE 
IN MONEY'' USED IN THE CONSTITUTION; THE ·TERM 
"TRUE VALUE" AND THE iTERM "REASONABLE FAIR 
CASH VALUE'' USED IN THE ·CODE IN DEFINING THE 
MEASURE OF VALUE T'O BE USED IN DETERMINING 
THE ASSESSED VALUE OF PRO·PERTY F'OR PROPERTY 
TAX PURPOSES. 
Title 59, Chapter 13, Section 3, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, imposes a franchise tax upon petitioner based 
upon the "fair value'' of its assets. Petitioner arrived 
at the "fair value" of its assets by reference to the 
assessed value of its property. The sole question to be 
determined by this appeal is whether petitioner erred in 
so doing. The Utah ·Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3 
provides that property shall be assessed ''according to 
its value in money." Chapter 59, Title 5, Section 1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, provides that property must be 
assessed at 40% of "its reasonable fair cash value,'' and 
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Title 59, Chapter 5, Section 46(9), provides that prop-
erty shall be assessed at "true value." 
Petitioner contends that the only correct method of 
valuation of property for proper tax purposes is its 
"value in money" as defined in the constitution, and that 
the other statutes which attempt to vary the method of 
valuation of property are unconstitutional and void. 
If we concede, for purposes of argument, that the 
aforesaid terms used to define how property shall be 
valued for property tax purposes are accurate, then the 
question remains whether the term ''fair value" used in 
the franchise tax act has substantially the same meaning 
as "value in money," "reasonable fair cash value" and 
"true value,'' used in the property tax act. 
The definitions all use the word ''value" qualified 
by various adjectives. In the case of Board of Educa-
tion of Rich County School District v. Passey, supra, 
the court held that "The word 'value' standing by itself 
can have only one meaning viz. the full worth or actual 
value-not a fractional share thereof.'' The court also 
cited with approval Hansen v. City of Hoquianz. 95 Wash. 
132, 163 P. 391. The Utah ·Court used the terms "actual 
values," ''reasonable fair eash valufl," "fair cash value," 
and "full value" in said case interchangeably~ in the 
following sentence, thus indicating that the meaning of 
each term is similar: "Where an assessor is directed by 
law to assess property at a percentage or fraction of its 
fair cash value, as is the case in this state, he must never-
theless first determine the actual value of the property 
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and then take a percentage or fractional share thereof 
as the ''assessed valuation" for tax purposes. It would 
seem impossible for an assessor to determine what is a 
certain percentage or fractional share of the actual value 
of a piece of property without first determining what is 
the full or actual value. (Italics added.) 
The term ~'fair value" used in the franchise tax act 
(supra) has been defined by many courts in just about 
the same manner as the various terms used in the afore-
said constitutional and statutory provisions in the Utah 
La\Y. See 16 'Vords and Phrases, Perm. Ed., 167, for 
definitions of the phrase "fair value." 
In Sear~ Roebuck & Co. v. State Tax Comm., sup.ra, 
the court ~tated that there is no substantial difference 
in 1neaning between ''fair value'' and "full cash value.'' 
In re Ouellette, D.C. Me., 98 F. Supp;. 941, 943 the 
court stated that ''fair value" means such a price as a 
capable and intelligent business man could presently 
obtain for property from a ready and willing buyer ac-
customed to buying such property. 
In re Aranoff & Sou, D.C. Ga., 1 F. Supp. 708, 710 
the eourt stated that "fair value" is value upon which 
\villing purchaser and seller would likely agree. 
In Taylor v. Lubetich, 97 P.2d 142, 144 Wash. 2d 6 
eourt stated that "fair value" has meaning of "reason-
able value." 
In Kerr v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 192 S.E. 741, 169 
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Va. 149 the court stated that ''actual value," "market 
valu~," "fair value'' and the like may be used as convert-
ible terms and may mean practically the same under 
same circumstances. 
In National Folding Box Co. v. City of New Haven, 
Conn., 153 A.2d 420, 424 and Town of Middlefield, 120 
A.2d 77, 80, 143 Conn. 100 the court stated that for tax 
purposes, the expressions "actual valuation," "actual 
value," ''market value," "market price," and "fair value" 
are synonymous and usually mean the figure fixed by 
sales in the ordinary business transactions. 
In the case of Burke v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 A.2d 
254, 259, 202 Md. 178 the court stated that the terms 
"value," "fair value," and "fair cash value'' are practi-
cally synonymous. 
The wording of the Utah constitution, Article XIII, 
Section 3 is clear and unambiguous in stating that prop-
erty shall be assessed and taxed according to its ''value 
in money." 6 Words and Phrases Perm. Ed. 271 cites 
many cases wherein the term "cash value," which is the 
equivalent of the term "value in money" used in the con-
stitution, is defined. 
In State v. Central Pac. Ry. Co., 10 Nev. 47, 48, 68, 
the court stated that the "cash value" of an article 
is measured by the amount of cash into which it can be 
converted. 
In Fort Worth & D. Ny. Ty. Co. v. Sugg, Tex. Civ. 
App., 68 S.W. 2d. 570, 572 the court stated that the terms 
"market value," "fair market value," "cash market 
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value," and "fair cash market value" are synonymous 
expressions. 
In Helin v. Grosse Point Tp., 45 N.W. 2d 338, 341, 
432, 329 Mich. 396 the court stated that the words "cash 
value'' as respects valuation of property for taxation 
purposes is the usual selling price that could be obtained 
at the time of the assess1nent but not the price that could 
be obtained at a forced or auction sale. 
In State v. Woodward, 93 So. 826, 208 Ala. 31 the 
court construed a statute similar to the Utah Statute in 
issue, which in that case provided that taxable property 
be assessed at 60% of its "fair and reasonable value," 
and the court held that this meant the best price obtain-
able at a voluntary sale, to be paid at once in money, 
and excluding any additional amount that might be had 
were credit or terms allowed; ''value" meaning the fair 
and reasonable value determinable by what the property 
would bring at a voluntary sale; "cash" being the anto-
nym of credit, meaning not merely money, but money in 
hand, readily available, paid down, especially coin or 
government or bank notes; "cash sale'' being a sale for 
ready money, goods, or stocks, for immediate delivery 
and payment, as distinguished from a credit sale or for 
future delivery; "cash value" importing value in money 
presently paid. 
In Jllontesano Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Portland Iron 
Works, 186 P. 428, 432, 94 Or. 677 the court stated that 
"reasonable value," or "fair cash value," and "actual 
cash value" are practically synonymous terms, and mean 
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the fair. or reasonable cash price for which the property 
can be sold on the market. 
See also 44 Words & Phrases, Perm. Ed. 47 and 63, 
for .definitions of "value," and 36 Words & Phrases, 
Perm. Ed., 407 for definitions of "reasonable value." 
It appears conclusive, from the cases cited above 
and other cases too numerous to mention, that he term 
"fair value" used in the corporation franchise act (supra) 
has essentially the same n1eaning as the terms used in the 
property tax act (supra), and accordingly that if the tax 
assessor has assessed property in the manner that the law 
makes mandatory, the assessed value of property for 
property tax purposes was properly used by petitioner 
to determine the ''fair value" of its property for fran-
chise tax purposes. 
POINT V 
STATE T'AX COMMISSION IS REQUIRED BY LAW TO 
ASSESS ALL PROPERTY AT 400fo OF ITS VALUE. TAX 
COMMISSION MUST FIRST DE·TERMINE FULL VALUE 
BEFORE _THEY CAN ARRIVE AT 40 Yo OF THE VALUE 
OF PROPERTY, AND ACCORDINGLY THE FULL VALUE 
IS 2:Y2 TIMES THE ASSESSED VALUE. 
Title 59, Chapter 5, Section 1, Utah ·Code Annotated, 
1953, p·rovides in part as follows: 
"RATE OF ASSESS~IENT OF PROP-
ERTY. -All taxable property must be assessed 
at forty percent of its reasonable fair cash value. 
" 
In Board of Education of Rich County School Dis-
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trict v. Passey, supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated in 
part as follows : 
"Where an assessor is directed by law to 
assess property at a percentage or fraction of its 
fair cash value, as is the case in this state, he 
must nevertheless first determine the actual value 
of the property and then take a percentage or 
fractional share thereof as the 'assessed valua-
tion' for tax purposes. It would seem impossible 
for an assessor to determine what is a certain 
percentage or fractional share of the actual value 
of a piece of property without first determining 
'vhat is the full or actual value. 'Thus the actual 
value is determined by the assessor ill making 
his assessment even though the 'assessed valua-
tion' upon which taxes are computed is less than 
the actual or full value, and from the last assess .. 
ment the full 'value of the taxable property' could 
be ascertained as readily as the assessed valua-
tion." 
The lTtah Court also cited with approval the case of 
Hansen v. City of Hoquiam, supra, wherein the court 
staed in part as follows : 
"So, that, when we have a statute which re-
quires the assessing officers to assess property 
for taxation 'not to exceed 50 per cent of its true 
and fair value in money' and the assessing offi-
rer do in fact assess it at 50 per cent of its true 
value, then by a simple rule of arithmetic its real 
value is as certainly ascertained by the assess-
nlent as if it had actually been assessed at its real 
value.'' 
Fron1 the foregoing citations, and from the clear 
\Vording of the statute in question, the conclusion seems 
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inescapable that petitioner did not err when it multiplied 
the assessed valuation of its property, as determined 
by the tax assessor, by 2% to convert the assessed value 
9f 40% to 100% of the full value of the petitioner's 
property. 
POINT VI 
S'TATE TAX COMMISSION IS BOUND BY ITS DETER-
MINATION OF THE VALUE OF PROPERTY FOR PROP-
ERTY TAX PURPOSES AND IT CANNOT CLAIM THAT 
SAME PROPERTY HAS A VALUE 185% HIGHER FOR 
FRANCHISE TAX PURPOSES THAN FOR PROPERTY TAX 
PURPOSES. 
Title 59, Chapter 5, Section 1, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, states that all ''property must be assessed at forty 
percent of its reasonable fair cash value .... " (Italics 
added.) 
The foregoing statute makes it mandatory that all 
property be assessed at 40% of its "reasonable fair cash 
value." 
Title 59, Chapter 5, Section 46(9), Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, concerning the general powers and duties of 
the State Tax Commission provides in part as follows: 
"To have and exercise general supervision 
over the administration of the tax laws of the 
state, over assessors and over county boards in 
the performance of their duties as countv boards 
of equalization and over other county officers in 
the performance of their duties in connection with 
assessment of property and collection of taxes, 
to the end that all assessments of property be 
made relatively just and equal, at true value, and 
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that the tax burden may be distributed without 
favor of discrimination." 
The foregoing statute indicates that the State Tax 
Commission shall have the last word and direct control 
over the assessment of property and the collection of 
taxes in Utah. It must necessarily follow that the deter-
mination of the tax assessor of the valuation of peti-
tioners property is the valuation of the State Tax ·Com-
mission, and that the State Tax Commission should be 
bound thereby. 
Petitioner is unable to discover any reasonable basis 
upon which the State Tax Commission can detennine 
that the ''fair value" of petitioner's property for fran-
chise tax purposes is 185% of its "value" for the same 
property for property tax purposes. 
POINT VII 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND DECISION 184 BEFORE THE STATE TAX COMMIS-
SION OF UTAH ARE CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND THE 
FACTS. 
The law in this case has been heretofore argued. 
The facts have been stipulated by the parties to this aer-
tion and are not in dispute. The position of the tax com-
mission that the depreciated book values of petitioner's 
property represent the "fair value" of said assets seems 
untenable in view of the cases cited above, and considers 
only one of many factors which must be considered to 
detennine the value of petitioner's property. In the case 
of State ex rel. Public Service Commission et al. v. South-
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ern Pac. Co. et al., (l)tate Tax Commission et al., inter-
veners), 95 Ut. 84,79 P. 2d 25 the court stated: 
" The tax assessor must, within legal limits, 
determine present market value and not what 
capital has been invested in the property." 
The court in the same case also stated that: 
"The State Tax Commission by Constitution 
and Statute was required to assess tangible utility 
property at its 'value in money' for taxation pur-
poses." 
The conclusion seems inescapable that the "fair 
value" or ''full value" of property can be determined 
by multiplying the assessed valuation by 2~ to convert 
the 40% of value used as assessed value to 100% or full 
value, and that the petitioner did not err in so doing to 
compute the "fair value" of its assets for purposes of 
the corporation franchise tax. 
CONCL lJSION 
It seems clear that the statutes concerning assess-
ment of property for property tax purposes are unconsti-
tutional since they attempt to vary the clear definition 
of value of property for tax purposes as set forth in the 
constitution of Utah. It also seems clear that, even if said 
~tatutes are not unconstitutional, the \\~ording used in 
the constitution and statutes, and in the corporation fran-
chise tax act in describing the value at which property 
is to be assessed has practically the same meaning, and 
that the same standard of 1neasurement of value should 
be used for both purposes. 
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The law makes it mandatory that all property be 
assessed at 40% of its value, and accordingly the full 
value can be ascertained by a simple mathematical com-
putation. 
The use of historical cost only, in determining value, 
completely ignores many other equally important factors, 
and is not fair or realistic. 
Decision 184 of the State Tax Commission of Utah 
should be set aside and the matter remanded with direc-
tions to annul, vacate and set aside the same under one 
or all of the points herein presented and argued. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD C. BARKER 
Attorney for Petitioner and 
Appellant 
712 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake ·City, Utah 
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